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 Nietzsche, Virtue, and the Horror of Existence 
Philip J. Kain 
Santa Clara University 
 
Abstract 
Robert Solomon argues that Nietzsche is committed to a virtue ethic like Aristotle's.  
Solomon’s approach seems unaware of Nietzsche’s belief in the horror of existence.  A 
life that contains as much suffering as Nietzsche expects a life to contain, could not be 
considered a good life by Aristotle.  To go further, as Nietzsche does in his doctrines of 
eternal recurrence and amor fati, to advocate loving such a fate, to refuse to change the 
slightest detail, Aristotle would find debased.  Nietzsche is committed to a virtue ethic, 
but not an Aristotelian one. 
 
 
I 
It has been argued that Nietzsche is committed to a virtue ethic.1  Solomon, for 
example, claims that Nietzsche is more like Aristotle than Kant.  Aristotle’s ethics, he 
holds, is not one of rules and principles—especially not universal ones.  It is concerned 
with excellence and is still involved with the Homeric warrior tradition.  The purpose of 
such an ethic is to maximize people’s potential and that will always be unequal for 
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Aristotle as well as Nietzsche.  Solomon thinks Nietzsche wants to return to the values of 
masterly virtue.2  The Übermensch is Aristotle’s megalopsychos—the great-souled man.3 
I have argued in another paper that it is a mistake to see Nietzsche as returning to the 
values of master morality.4  But further than that, Solomon’s whole approach seems 
unaware of Nietzsche’s belief in the horror of existence.  While Nietzsche might have 
been impressed by Aristotle’s megalopsychos,5 Aristotle would be appalled by 
Nietzsche’s Übermensch.  A life that contains as much suffering as Nietzsche expects a 
life to contain could not be considered a good life by Aristotle.  To go further, as 
Nietzsche does, to advocate loving such a fate, to refuse to change the slightest detail, 
Aristotle would find debased—perhaps even demented.  At any rate, the life of the 
Übermensch is not a flourishing life in Aristotle’s sense.  These claims will have to be 
explained and defended. 
 
II 
At the center of Nietzsche's vision lies his concept of the "terror and horror of existence."6  
As he puts it in The Birth of Tragedy:  
"There is an ancient story that King Midas hunted in the forest a long time for the 
wise Silenus, the companion of Dionysus….When Silenus at last fell into his hands, the 
king asked what was the best and most desirable of all things for man.  Fixed and 
immovable, the demigod said not a word, till at last, urged by the king, he gave a shrill 
laugh and broke out into these words:  'Oh, wretched ephemeral race, children of 
chance and misery, why do you compel me to tell you what it would be most expedient 
for you not to hear?  What is best of all is utterly beyond your reach:  not to be born, 
not to be, to be nothing.  But the second best for you is—to die soon.'"7 
 
Why is it best never to have been born?  Because all we can expect as human beings is 
senseless suffering—suffering for no reason at all.8  In Nietzsche's view we live in an empty, 
meaningless cosmos.9  We cannot look into reality without being overcome.  Indeed, in Beyond 
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Good and Evil, he even suggests that "it might be a basic characteristic of existence that those 
who would know it completely would perish…"10 
And it was not just intellectual reflection that led Nietzsche to a belief in the horror of 
existence.  He lived it himself. 11  In a letter of April 10, 1888, he writes:  
Around 1876 my health grew worse….There were extremely painful and obstinate 
headaches which exhausted all my strength.  They increased over long years, to reach a 
climax at which pain was habitual, so that any given year contained for me two hundred 
days of pain….My specialty was to endure the extremity of pain…with complete 
lucidity for two or three days in succession, with continuous vomiting of mucus.12   
 
It is also Nietzsche’s view that if we look deeply into the essence of things, into the horror 
of existence, we will be overwhelmed—paralyzed.  Like Hamlet we will not be able to act, 
because we see that action cannot change the eternal nature of things.13  We must realize, 
Nietzsche says, that "a profound illusion…first saw the light of the world in the person of 
Socrates:  the unshakeable faith that thought…can penetrate the deepest abysses of being, and 
that thought is capable not only of knowing being but even of correcting it.  This sublime 
metaphysical illusion accompanies science as an instinct…"14  In Nietzsche's view, we cannot 
change things.  Instead, with Hamlet we should "feel it to be ridiculous or humiliating that [we] 
should be asked to set right a world that is out of joint."15  
Knowledge of the horror of existence kills action.  Action requires distance and illusion.  
The horror and meaninglessness of existence must be veiled if we are to live and act.  What we 
must do, Nietzsche thinks, is construct a meaning for suffering.  Suffering we can handle.  
Meaningless suffering, suffering for no reason at all, we cannot handle.  So we give it a 
meaning.  We invent a meaning.  We create an illusion.  The Greeks constructed gods for 
whom wars and other forms of suffering were festival plays and thus an occasion to be 
celebrated by the poets.  Christians imagine a God for whom suffering is punishment for sin.16 
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Even if we were to reject Nietzsche's view, even if we refuse to accept the notion that it is 
impossible to significantly reduce suffering, the whole question may well become moot.  
Nietzsche tells a story: 
Once upon a time, in some out of the way corner of that universe which is dispersed 
into numberless twinkling solar systems, there was a star upon which clever beasts 
invented knowing.  That was the most arrogant and mendacious minute of "world 
history," but nevertheless, it was only a minute.  After nature had drawn a few breaths, 
the star cooled and congealed, and the clever beasts had to die.17 
 
Whatever progress we might think we are making in reducing suffering, whatever change 
we think we are bringing about, it may all amount to nothing more than a brief and accidental 
moment in biological time, whose imminent disappearance will finally confirm the horror and 
meaninglessness of existence.   
I do not think we can dismiss Nietzsche's view simply because it goes counter to 
mainstream assumptions.  And we certainly cannot dismiss it if we hope to understand 
Nietzsche.   
 
III 
Let us try to draw out the philosophical implications that follow from the horror of 
existence.  If existence really is horrible, if to know it completely, as Nietzsche suggests in 
Beyond Good and Evil, means we are likely to perish,18 then knowledge of the truth cannot 
be good for us.  The horror of existence, if we think through its consequences, will put us 
radically at odds with perhaps the most fundamental assumption of philosophy since Plato 
and Aristotle, namely, that the true and the good coincide.  Philosophers assume that the 
truth—far from being harmful—will be good for us.  And what is really good for us will 
necessarily be something that is not an illusion or a lie but the truth.  As Nietzsche puts it:  
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"All supreme values are of the first rank, all the supreme concepts…the good, the 
true….neither can these supreme concepts be incommensurate with one another, be 
incompatible with one another…"19  Nietzsche also says, "I seek to understand out of what 
idiosyncrasy that Socratic equation reason = virtue = happiness derives:  that bizarrest of 
equations and one which has in particular all the instincts of the older Hellenes against it."20  
For Socrates, the true, the good, and also happiness coincide. 
So also, in Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle tells us that the highest 
happiness is activity in accord with the highest excellence, that is, the contemplative activity 
of the intellect.21  Why should intellectual activity necessarily make us happy?  There is a 
hidden assumption buried in Aristotle's argument.  If we were to look back to Sophocles, it 
would not at all be the case for him that the life of the intellect—theoretical wisdom—could 
be expected to make us happy.  Such wisdom would allow us to see more deeply into the 
truth of things and thus to see what a miserable, terrible, and alien cosmos we live in.  We 
would see into the horror of existence.  Sophocles too quotes the wisdom of Silenus.  Best 
never to have been born; second best, die as soon as possible.  All we can expect in this 
world is to suffer.22  
This, obviously, is not Aristotle's view.  In the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle tells us, 
approvingly, "that Anaxagoras answered a man who was…asking why one should choose 
rather to be born than not by saying 'for the sake of viewing the heavens and the whole order 
of the universe'."23  For Aristotle, "existence is to all men a thing to be chosen and loved…"24  
For Aristotle, human beings fit the cosmos, they belong, they are at home.  It is as if the 
cosmos and human beings were designed for each other.   
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For virtue to be compatible with happiness it is necessary that the individual acting 
virtuously fit the world.  We cannot be happy if we continually grate against existence.  So 
also, if knowing the truth about existence is to be compatible with happiness, the truth cannot 
be that existence is horrible and terrifying.  If to be happy, we must avoid knowing the truth, 
if we must conceal it, if we must lie about it, then the true and the good are not compatible.  
If the truth is that existence is horrible and terrifying, then the life of the intellect cannot 
produce happiness, and the good for human beings cannot be the contemplative life of the 
intellect.  Truth, goodness, and happiness would not accord.  
But for Aristotle they do accord.  And for Plato, if we could free ourselves from our 
chains, if we could climb up out of the cave, if we could get used to looking at the sun, we 
would see that the idea of the good is not only compatible with, but is the very source of, the 
true.25  The last thing we would want would be to return to the bottom of the cave.  
Contemplating the true and the good, for Plato, would be the highest happiness.26  Here, the 
truth is not horror and terror.  
So also, the view of modern science is that human rationality can discover the truth, that 
this is good for human beings, and that it will lead to overall progress for humanity, that is, to 
increasing happiness.   
Nietzsche rejects all of this:  "For a philosopher to say, 'the good and the beautiful are 
one,' is infamy; if he goes on to add, 'also the true,' one ought to thrash him.  Truth is ugly.… 
We possess art lest we perish of the truth."27  He also says, "There is no preestablished 
harmony between the furthering of truth and the well-being," that is, the good, "of 
humanity."28 
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There is nothing Nietzsche would reject more, we might say, than Plato's allegory of the 
cave.29  We cannot climb up out of the cave and look directly at the truth.  It would probably 
kill us.  There is a reason why we are down in the cave with our backs to the truth.  It is true 
that the shadows at the bottom of the cave are illusions, distortions, lies.  But it is not true 
that the shadows lock us into a prison.  They keep out the horror.  They preserve life.  Life 
exists, only exists, at the bottom of the cave. 
The truth is not good for human beings—the truth is horror.  Reality as it truly is, is not 
beautiful—it is terrifying.  To pursue the truth, far from pursuing the good and achieving 
happiness, as most all philosophers have assumed, would have the consequence of plunging 
humankind into the abyss, of rubbing their noses in the horror of existence.  Life requires 
lies, illusion, art, veiling.  Life must shun the truth.  Life is not possible with the truth.  To 
pursue the good, what is best for human beings, requires rejection of the true.30 
One might try to respond that while it is obviously the case that some things are not good 
for us, nevertheless, knowing the truth is always good for us.  It is certainly best for us to 
know what is bad, dangerous, threatening, and so forth.  It might help us to avoid such things.  
But if existence is truly alien, if to come to know the truth means we are likely to perish, if it 
is at odds with human life, if existence is ontologically horrible (not just occasionally 
irritating), then Jocasta is right, knowing the truth is not good for us.31  That is the subversive 
proposition Nietzsche wants to force us to think about. 
 
IV  
Nietzsche embraces the doctrine of eternal recurrence for the first time in The Gay Science: 
The greatest weight.—What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you 
into your loneliest loneliness and say to you:  "This life as you now live it and have 
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lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more; and there will be 
nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and 
everything unutterably small or great in your life will have to return to you, all in the 
same succession and sequence—even this spider and this moonlight between the trees, 
and even this moment and I myself.  The eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside 
down again and again, and you with it, speck of dust!" 
Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who 
spoke thus?  Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment when you would 
have answered him:  "You are a god and never have I heard anything more divine."  If 
this thought gained possession of you, it would change you as you are or perhaps crush 
you.  The question in each and every thing, "Do you desire this once more and 
innumerable times more?" would lie upon your actions as the greatest weight.  Or how 
well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life to crave nothing more 
fervently than this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal?32 
 
It is not enough that eternal recurrence simply be believed.  Nietzsche demands that it 
actually be loved.  In Ecce Homo, he explains his doctrine of amor fati:  "My formula for 
greatness in a human being is amor fati:  that one wants nothing to be different, not forward, 
not backward, not in all eternity.  Not merely bear what is necessary, still less conceal it…but 
love it."33  In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche says:  "To redeem those who lived in the past 
and to recreate all 'it was' into a 'thus I willed it'—that alone should I call redemption."34  To 
turn all "it was" into a "thus I willed it" is to accept fate fully, to love it.  One would have it no 
other way; one wants everything eternally the same, "'Was that life?….Well then!  Once 
more!'"35   
How are we to understand these doctrines?  The first thing we must do is notice that the 
philosopher who introduces eternal recurrence and amor fati is the very same philosopher who 
also believes in the horror and terror of existence—a point that is never emphasized by 
commentators.  Lou Salomé tells us that Nietzsche spoke to her of eternal recurrence only 
"with a quiet voice and with all signs of deepest horror….Life, in fact, produced such suffering 
in him that the certainty of an eternal return of life had to mean something horrifying to him."36  
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Imagine yourself with the worst migraine possible.  Imagine yourself in a feverish state 
experiencing violent nausea and continuous vomiting.  Imagine that this sort of thing has been 
going on for years and years, and that you have been unable to do anything about it.  Extreme 
care with your diet, concern for climate, continuous experimenting with medicines, all 
accomplish nothing.  You are unable to cure yourself.  You have been unable even to improve 
your condition.37  You have no expectation of ever doing so.  Suppose this state has led you to 
see, or perhaps merely confirmed your insight into, the horror and terror of existence.  It has 
led you to think that Silenus was right.  Best never to have been born.  Second best, die as soon 
as possible.  All you can expect is suffering, suffering for no reason at all, meaningless 
suffering.  You have even thought of suicide.38  Now imagine that at your worst moment, your 
loneliest loneliness, a demon appears to you, or you imagine a demon appearing to you.  And 
this demon tells you that you will have to live your life over again, innumerable times more, 
and that everything, every last bit of pain and suffering, every last migraine, every last bout of 
nausea and vomiting, will return, exactly the same, over and over and over again. 
What would your reaction be?  If your reaction were to be negative, no one would bat an 
eye.  But what if your reaction was, or came to be, positive?  What if you were able to love 
your life so completely that you would not want to change a single moment—a single moment 
of suffering?  What if you were to come to crave nothing more fervently than the eternal 
recurrence of every moment of your life?  What if you were to see this as an ultimate 
confirmation and seal, nothing more divine?  How could you do this?  Why would you do this?  
Why wouldn't it be madness?  What is going on here?  How has this been overlooked by all the 
commentators?  This cries out for explanation.  
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Eternal recurrence, I think we can say, shows us the horror of existence.  No matter what 
you say about your life, no matter how happy you claim to have been, no matter how bright a 
face you put on it, the threat of eternal recurrence brings out the basic horror in any life.  Live 
it over again with nothing new?  It is the 'nothing new' that does it.  That is how we make it 
through our existing life.  We hope for, we expect, something new, something different, some 
improvement, some progress, or at least some distraction, some hope.  If that is ruled out, if 
everything will be exactly the same in our next life, well that is a different story.  If you find 
people who claims to be supremely happy with their life, just see what happens if they start to 
think that they will have to live it again. 
Suppose that you can, as Aristotle suggests, look back over your life as a whole and feel 
that it was a good one—a happy one.  Would that make you want to live it again?  Would you 
at the moment in which you feel that your life was a happy one also "crave nothing more 
fervently" than to live it again?  What if your life was a joyous life or a proud life?  It is quite 
clear isn't it that you could have a very positive attitude toward your life, and not at all want to 
live it again?  In fact, wouldn't the prospect of eternal repetition, if the idea grew upon you and 
gained possession of you, begin to sap even the best life of its attractiveness?  Wouldn't the 
expectation of eternal repetition make anything less appealing?  Wouldn't it empty your life of 
its significance and meaning?  Most commentators seem to assume that the only life we could 
expect anyone to want to live again would be a good life.  That makes no sense at all to me.  
On the other hand, most would assume that a life of intense pain and suffering is not at all the 
sort of life it makes any sense to want to live again.  I think Nietzsche was able to see that a life 
of intense pain and suffering is perhaps the only life it really makes sense to want to live again.  
This requires explanation. 
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For years Nietzsche was ill, suffering intense migraines, nausea, and vomiting.  Often he 
was unable to work and confined to bed.  He fought this.  He tried everything.  He sought a 
better climate.  He watched his diet fanatically.  He experimented with medicines.  Nothing 
worked.  He could not improve his condition.  His suffering was out of his control.  It 
dominated his life and determined his every activity.  He was overpowered by it.  There was no 
freedom or dignity here.  He became a slave to his illness.  He was subjugated by it.  What was 
he to do? 
At the beginning of the essay, "Concerning the Sublime," Schiller wrote: 
nothing is so beneath the dignity of a human being as to suffer 
violence….whoever cowardly suffers it, tosses his humanity aside….Every 
human being finds himself in this position.  He is surrounded by countless 
forces, all superior to him and all playing the master over him.…If he can no 
longer oppose physical forces with a corresponding physical force, then nothing 
else remains for him to do to avoid suffering violence than to do completely 
away with a relation so deleterious to him and to destroy conceptually a brute 
force that he in fact must endure.  However, to destroy a force conceptually 
means nothing other than to submit to it voluntarily.39 
 
While Nietzsche does not go about it in the way Schiller had in mind, nevertheless, 
this is exactly what Nietzsche does.  What was he to do about his suffering?  What was 
he to do about the fact that it came to dominate every moment of his life?  What was he 
to do about the fact that it was robbing him of all freedom and dignity?  What was he to 
do about this subjugation and slavery?  He decided to submit to it voluntarily.  He 
decided to accept it fully.  He decided that he would not change a single detail of his life, 
not one moment of pain.  He decided to love his fate.  At the prospect of living his life 
over again, over again an infinite number of times, without the slightest change, with 
every detail of suffering and pain, he was ready to say, "Well then!  Once more!'"40  He 
could not change his life anyway.  But this way he broke the psychological stranglehold it 
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had over him.  He ended his subjugation.  He put himself in charge.  He turned all "it 
was" into a "thus I willed it."  Everything that was going to happen in his life, he 
accepted, he chose, he willed.  He became sovereign over his life.  There was no way to 
overcome his illness except by embracing it.  
 
V 
Let us now turn our attention to virtue.  While it can easily be shown that Nietzsche 
believes in virtue, I do not think he believes in ordinary virtue.  He says:  "One should 
defend virtue against the preachers of virtue:  they are its worst enemies.  For they teach 
virtue as an ideal for everyone; they take from virtue the charm of rareness, 
inimitableness, exceptionalness and unaverageness—its aristocratic magic."41  In Beyond 
Good and Evil, he also says:  "It is probable that we, too, still have our virtues, although 
in all fairness they will not be the simpleminded and foursquare virtues for which we 
hold our grandfathers in honor—and at arms length."42  Nietzsche thinks that "each one 
of us should devise his own virtue…"43 
He says that he is "actually the very opposite of the type of man who so far has been 
revered as virtuous."44  In fact, he thinks that any virtue "becomes a virtue through rising 
against that blind power of the factual and tyranny of the actual.…It always swims 
against the tide of history…"45  This suggests that a figure like King Vishvamitra, who 
Nietzsche describes in the Genealogy of Morals, could be a model for the development of 
virtue:   
As men of frightful ages, they did this by using frightful means:  cruelty toward 
themselves, inventive self-castigation—this was the principal means these power-
hungry hermits and innovators of ideas required to overcome the gods and 
tradition in themselves, so as to be able to believe in their own innovations.  I 
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recall the famous story of King Vishvamitra, who through millennia of self-
torture acquired such a feeling of power and self-confidence that he endeavored to 
build a new heaven—the uncanny symbol of the most ancient and most recent 
experience of philosophers on earth:  whoever has at some time built a "new 
heaven" has found the power to do so only in his own hell.46 
 
To overthrow the tyranny of the actual, to overcome the gods and tradition, one must 
develop new powers, new self-confidence, new capacities, new virtues.  We must:  
confront our inherited and hereditary nature with our knowledge, and through a 
new, stern discipline combat our inborn heritage and implant in ourselves a new 
habit, a new instinct, a second nature, so that our first nature withers away.  It is 
an attempt to give oneself, as it were a posteriori, a past in which one would like 
to originate in opposition to that in which one did originate…47 
 
The old virtues are at odds with the type of person Nietzsche wants to realize.  This 
person will require the development of new and different virtues.  It is even the case that:  
"what is good and evil no one knows yet, unless it be he who creates.  He, however, 
creates man’s goal and gives the earth its meaning and its future.  That anything at all is 
good and evil—that is his creation."48  Only when a Vishvamitra has created a new 
heaven, that is, a new meaning structure, a new moral paradigm, will we be able to tell 
what is good and evil and develop new virtues accordingly. 
A virtue ethic is capable of asking what is good for a certain type of person, rather 
than what is good for everyone or for the majority, and it can take what is good for this 
person as good.  Nietzsche thinks that as we move past the ancient world, as we move 
through Christianity and into the modern world, we move further and further from 
understanding good in this way.  We understand it more and more as the utilitarian 
does—as what benefits the greatest number.  Nietzsche wants to return to the question of 
what is good for a certain type of person.  In this respect Solomon is quite correct in 
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claiming that Nietzsche is much the same as Aristotle.  But I do not think that Nietzsche 
and Aristotle have in mind anything like the same type of person.  
Aristotelian virtue is completely at odds with Nietzsche’s vision of the horror of 
existence and the need to conceal it.  If we ask the simplest of questions, if we ask how 
we should value the traditional virtue of truthfulness, we quickly see that Nietzsche and 
Aristotle would be deeply opposed.  For Nietzsche, we cannot give anything like the 
traditional answer, the answer Aristotle’s would certainly give.  For Nietzsche, we need 
illusion, we need art, we need lies.49  We must conceal the truth—the horror of existence.  
The Übermensch must build up the power to create a grand illusion.50  We do not, for 
Nietzsche, live in a world where the good and the true will agree.  The truth is that reality 
is horrible—not good.  If we seek what is good for us, if we seek human well-being, if we 
seek a flourishing life, if we seek happiness, we must shun the true.  Traditional morality, 
however, assumes that the good and the true coincide.  If the good does not coincide with 
the true, if we must choose between the good and the true, then we cannot have anything 
like an Aristotelian virtue ethic.  If virtues are characteristics, dispositions, or powers that 
enable us to do what is good for us, and if this must leave out what is true, indeed, even 
serve to hide what is true,51 then we cannot have anything like an Aristotelian notion of 
virtue.  For Aristotle, if we develop a characteristic or power that works to hide the true, 
it would not be a virtue but a vice.  For Aristotle, "reasoning must be true and the desire 
right, if the choice is to be good…"52  If, however, the true is horrible, if it is terrible, then 
characteristics or powers that enable us to hide the true, characteristics that would 
normally be called vices, become virtues.53   
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Nietzsche is definitely committed to a virtue ethic.  He attends to characteristics, 
dispositions, and powers that he wants developed in individuals (at least some 
individuals), but the characteristics he values, that he takes to be good, that he takes to be 
virtues, are not ones that enable us to find the true or to live in accord with it.54  Rather, 
Nietzsche seeks the very opposite, powers that hide the true, that make life possible, 
powers that would normally be called vices.  Thus, in Will to Power, he says:  
Let us not hide from ourselves this most curious result:  I have imparted to virtue 
a new charm—the charm of something forbidden.…Only after we have 
recognized everything as lies and appearance do we regain the right to this fairest 
of falsehoods, virtue.…only by exhibiting virtue as a form of immorality do we 
again justify it…it is part of the fundamental immorality of all existence…the 
haughtiest, dearest and rarest form of vice.55 
 
It is true that Nietzsche seeks the sorts of virtues that would empower the great man 
or the Übermensch and allow him to flourish.  But this is a radically different kind of 
flourishing than Aristotle had in mind.  As MacIntyre puts it, for Aristotle, virtues enable 
us to realize our true nature and reach our true end.56  In realizing our nature, in becoming 
what we should become, in realizing our true end, we will achieve our good, that is, we 
will flourish and be happy.  This implies and requires a fit between the human essence 
and the world.  It is as if they were designed for each other—certainly they cannot be 
alien and opposed to each other.  For Nietzsche, this is ridiculous.  To realize our nature 
as Aristotle understands nature, to achieve our good as Aristotle understands good, that 
is, a good that accords with the true, far from allowing us to flourish, far from making us 
happy, would plunge us into the horror and terror of existence.  We live in an alien and 
hostile cosmos and we need lies to conceal this fact from ourselves.   
Moreover, we need the power to create and maintain these illusions.  Such powers are 
virtues.  They build a certain kind of character.  They build a disposition.  They enable 
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one to function in a certain way.  To this extent we have a virtue ethic.  But it does not 
realize our essence.  If, for Nietzsche, we can even be said to have an essence, it would be 
some sort of Dionysian chaos, and the task of any virtue would be to conceal it, not 
realize it.57  As far as our true end goes, if we can in any way be said to have one, it 
would be horror and terror, something we do not want to realize, something we want to 
conceal.  
If we can look back over our entire life and say it was a good one, then, for Aristotle, 
it was a happy life.  If in looking back over our entire life, we must instead admit that it 
was a life of horrible and meaningless suffering, then, for Aristotle, it would be 
impossible to say it was a happy life.58  If it is necessary to lie, to live in illusion, in order 
to conceal this meaningless suffering, then, for Aristotle, it would be impossible to say it 
was a good life. 
What if, however, one was able to look back over such a life and was able to love it?  
What if one would not be willing to change a single moment of suffering?  Would that 
make one's life a happy one?  Certainly not for Aristotle.  Nietzsche, at least at times, will 
suggest that it could.59  But what does he mean by happiness?  Certainly not the good life 
in Aristotle's sense.  Happiness is understood as power,60 or is replaced by power.61  In 
the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche says: 
Every animal—therefore la bête philosophe, too—instinctively strives for an 
optimum of favorable conditions under which it can expend all its strength and 
achieve its maximal feeling of power….(I am not speaking of its path to 
happiness, but its path to power…and in most cases actually its path to 
unhappiness).62 
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Virtue, for Aristotle, allows us to fit with reality, be at home, and be happy.  Virtue, 
for Nietzsche, allows us to construct a new heaven, conceal an alien cosmos, and 
experience the satisfaction of power—not happiness. 
Something is a virtue for Aristotle if it contributes to living a good life, a happy life.  
Something is a virtue for Nietzsche if it enables you to love your fate, live with suffering, 
not want to change a single moment: 
Every basic character trait that is encountered at the bottom of every event, that 
finds expression in every event, would have to lead every individual who 
experienced it as his own basic character trait to welcome every moment of 
universal existence with a sense of triumph.  The crucial point would be that one 
experienced this basic character trait in oneself as good, valuable—with 
pleasure.63 
 
If you look back over your life, for Nietzsche, you do not ask the same question 
Aristotle would have you ask.  You do not ask if it was a good life, let alone the best life.  
If you ask that, you would immediately see that any life could be improved by changing 
this or adding that.  To dwell on such concerns, however, would threaten to re-enslave 
you to your suffering.  Instead, you must have unqualified love for every detail of your 
life.64  Why?  Not because every detail deserves it, not because your life was the best life 
in Aristotle's sense, not because it could not be made better in Aristotle's sense, but 
because if you do not, then the pain and suffering of your life could begin to reassert 
itself, eat away at you, subjugate you.  If you do not love every moment of your life, 
those moments you do not love, may begin to reassert their psychological stranglehold.  
They may begin to dominate you.  You will begin to wish you did not have to suffer 
through so many of them, you will try to develop strategies for coping with them, you 
will worry about them, and pretty soon you may again be enslaved by them.  Your 
attitude toward any moment cannot be a desire to avoid it, change it, reduce it—or it may 
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begin to dominate you.65  Such love, Aristotle would consider abject and degrading.  
Aristotle would completely reject the Übermensch. 
On the other hand, though, if in looking back over your life, for Aristotle, you were to 
find it a good one, a happy one, even the best life, there would be nothing about it that 
would necessarily make you want to live it again.  And if one day you were informed by 
the demon that you had to live it again over and over an infinite number of times, even 
Aristotle, as this idea gained possession of him, might "throw [him]self down and gnash 
[his] teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus…"66   
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